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INTRODUCTION
The morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001 defined our nation
and altered our collective perspective regarding how our country
protects its citizens. In the immediate wake of the most massive
single-event disaster in our nation's history, Congress passed the Air
Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act I which enacted the
2September 11th Victim Compensation Fund (9/11 Fund). This
program was designed to be a no-fault administrative compensation
scheme serving as an alternative to tort litigation.3 Victims who were
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1. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42,
115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012)).
2. See Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 2005), for an
explanation of the purpose of the 9/11 Fund.
3. Can. Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckversicherung (Deutschland)
AG, 335 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2003); see generally James R. Copland, Tragic
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physically injured and families of victims whose lives were taken as
a result of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the
Pentagon, and in Shanksville, Pennsylvania became eligible to
receive tax-free awards as compensation for their economic and
noneconomic losses.4 Those who opted to receive compensation
through this means waived their right to sue for damages for injury or
death as a result of the terrorist attacks .
This Note concerns the issue of compensation funds and the
adequacy of legal responses to terrorism and other similar national
emergencies. It focuses primarily on the reopened 9/11 Fund
mandated by the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act
of 2010 (Zadroga Act).6 While the original 9/11 Fund only served the
victims (or their representatives) who were either killed or injured as
a direct result of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,' the
Zadroga Act renews and expands the 9/11 Fund to compensate
victims for injury or death related to the debris removal process
conducted in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks and exposure to the
toxic air in lower Manhattan and the other attack sites during that
time.
The purpose of this Note is to inspire a healthy debate over the
strengths and weaknesses of this form of public compensation as a
solution to offsetting suffering from life's greatest tragedies. Because
this topic cannot be comprehensively studied within the vacuum of
its pertinent but limiting legal dimensions, the social, political,
Solutions: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, Historical Antecedents, and
Lessons for Tort Reform 2-10 (Manhattan Institute for Pol'y Research, Working
Paper, Jan. 13, 2005), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/
clpwp_ 01-13-05.pdf (examining the success of the 9/11 Fund as a consideration in
the tort reform dialogue).
4. SHEILA BIRNBAUM, FIRST ANNUAL STATUS REPORT: SEPTEMBER 11TH
VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND 1 (2012), http://www.vcf.gov/pdf/
VCFStatusReportOct2012.pdf.
5. Id.; Frequently Asked Questions, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION
FUND 1, http://www.vcf.gov/pdfVCFFAQsFINAL20131210.pdf (last updated
Dec. 10, 2013).
6. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-347, 124 Stat. 3623 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26,
42, and 49 U.S.C. (2012)).
7. BIRNBAUM, supra note 4.
8. Id.
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cultural, and economic implications of victim compensation funds
will also be examined. Part I will examine how the circumstances
surrounding the renewed 9/11 Fund differed from those pertaining to
the initiation of its original version. Brief backgrounds on the two
versions of the 9/11 Fund will first be provided, followed by an
exploration of the causal issues that complicate recovery in toxic
exposure cases. As a corollary, Part II will attempt to analyze the
effectiveness of the 9/11 Fund as a no-fault administrative
compensation scheme substitution for tort litigation generally, and
more specifically, for toxic tort litigation.9 This analysis will begin to
shed light on the reasons why compensation funds are more
beneficial in response to certain events than to others.
Part III of this Note will address the inadequacies of this type of
compensation fund for the conditions that designed the Zadroga Act.
A proposal will ultimately be presented in Part IV for a revised no-
fault compensation system that confronts these shortfalls so as to
prepare for mass calamities that may potentially befall our nation in
the decades to come. What will hopefully follow is future discourse
regarding this very relevant and significant topic.
I. BACKGROUND ON THE 9/11 FUND
A. The 9/11 Fund
In its original form, the 9/11 Fund served as a compensation
scheme intended to replace the need for litigation. A unique trial in
American history, it provided extremely substantial awards that were
funded by tax-free public money to a relatively narrow group of
9. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Price Waterhouse, 683 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div.
1998). The court in Ackerman establishes the requirements for a class action in
New York when:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable: (2) common questions of law or fact predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members; (3) the claims of the
representative parties are typical of the class as a whole; (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class; and (5) the class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy ....
Id. at 188.
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individuals. 10 While the original fund was active, ninety-seven
percent of eligible claimants voluntarily participated in it. The
average award distributed to families of a deceased victim was more
than $2 million, and the average tax-free award for victims with
physical injuries, such as third degree burns, was nearly $400
million.12 The total amount of compensation distributed by Special
Master of the Fund Kenneth Feinberg during the duration of the Fund
13
was over $7 billion for 5,560 claims compensating 5,553 families
and victims.14 It was ultimately closed in 2004 once the available
money had been fully distributed. 15
Due to the unprecedented nature of the terrorist attacks on
September 11th, the purpose and scope of the 9/11 Fund was
unparalleled16 with no corresponding blueprint in existence with
which to guide Congress during the creation process. 1 Because
vengeance could not be sought on the nineteen terrorists who took
their own lives during their savage assault, those who died on
September 11th, as well as the nation as a whole, needed some other
method to heal the deep wound. 8
10. Aaron Smith, The 911 Fund: Putting a Price on Life, CNN MONEY (Sept.
7, 2011, 9:38 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/news/economy/911
compensation fund/index.htm.
11. KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR
THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001, at 1, 80 (2004),
http://www.justice.gov/final report.pdf.
12. Id. at 1.
13. In re September 11 Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
14. Kenneth R. Feinberg, What Have We Learned About Compensating Victims
of Terrorism?, RAND REV., Summer 2004, at 33, 33, available at http://
www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/summer2004/33.html.
15. BIRNBAUM, supra note 4, at 1.
16. Robert Ackerman, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: An
Effective Administrative Response to National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
135, 145 (2005).
17. Mike Steenson & Joseph Michael Sayler, The Legacy of the 911 Fund and
the Minnesota I-35w Bridge-Collapse Fund: Creating A Template for
Compensating Victims of Future Mass-Tort Catastrophes, 35 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 524, 531 (2009).
18. See Tom R. Tyler & Hulda Thorisdottir, A Psychological Perspective on
Compensation for Harm: Examining the September 11th Victim Compensation
Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 357 (2003) (arguing that because the true
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In addition to providing a compensation mechanism for individuals
who were killed or injured on September 11th, Congress intended the
original 9/11 compensation fund to limit the liability of major, deep-
pocket corporations, such as the airlines, in the immediate aftermath
of the terrorist attacks. 19 This original legislation, however, did not
contemplate that thousands of individuals would contract
incapacitating illnesses from exposure to the dust and debris that
polluted the air at the crash sites for some time as a result of the
tragic events.20
B. The James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of2010
A mixture of noxious toxins was released in lower Manhattan after
the attack on and subsequent collapse of the Twin Towers and other
surrounding buildings on September 11, 2001. The Twin Towers, all
of its contents, and two Boeing 767-200 aircrafts21 were incinerated
22
and aerosolized into one toxic brew. Immediately after the collapse
of the towers and during the subsequent years, first responders,
volunteers, and nearby residents were exposed to this toxic cloud that
was comprised of, among other things, asbestos fibers, mercury,
perpetrators could not be held responsible for the attacks, the government
established a fund).
19. Randall S. Abate, Corporate Responsibility and Climate Justice: A
Proposal for a Polluter-Financed Relocation Fund for Federally Recognized
Tribes Imperiled by Climate Change, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 10, 34 (2013).
The principle theory of liability is founded on negligence, which indicates a
defendant has either acted or has failed to act in a way such that the defendant's
action or inaction is below the necessary standard for someone participating in the
applicable activity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965). Because the
9/11 Fund awards provide compensation to eligible claimants on a no-fault basis,
"the Special Master shall not consider negligence or any other theory of
liability ... [and he] may not include amounts for punitive damages. . . ." Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act § 405(b)(2), (5), 49 U.S.C. §
40101.
20. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 383,
384 (2007).
21. John Howard, The World Trade Center Disaster: Health Effects and
Compensation Mechanisms, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 69, 69 (2007).
22. Id. at 71-72.
2014] 513
514 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
23diesel particles, and volatile and semi-volatile organic compounds.
Due to the enormity of such a disaster and the pervasiveness of the
toxic cloud, the level of exposure to these airborne toxins is varied
and largely unknown.24
For months following the terrorist attacks, a massive cleanup and
reconstruction effort took place at Ground Zero, the site of New York
25City's worst environmental disaster in history. Thousands of
individuals contributed to the effort while inhaling the harmful dust,
smoke, toxic chemicals, and particle remnants of the World Trade
Center Towers. Other individuals who either lived or worked in the
area were similarly exposed.
In order to address potential lawsuits resulting from this exposure,
Congress approved the Zadroga Act on December 22, 2010 and
signed it into law on January 2, 2011.26 Named after New York
Police Department (NYPD) Detective James Zadroga who worked at
Ground Zero and died as a result of inhaling the dust at the scene, the
Zadroga Act reactivated the 9/11 Fund27 and expanded the definition
of "eligible individuals" who could seek damages. 28 Within its
compensation scheme, the Zadroga Act includes police officers,
firefighters, EMS workers, construction workers, cleanup workers,
utility workers, volunteer workers, original survivors, downtown
residents, and other individuals who suffered physical harm during or
as a result of debris removal and related undertakings at the
September 11th crash sites, as long as these victims were present at
the sites during the time of the crashes or during cleanup from
29September 11, 2001 to May 30, 2002. In addition to proving that
23. Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007); In re World Trade
Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd in part,
appeal dismissed in part, 521 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2008).
24. See infra Part III.
25. David M. Newman, 9/11 Environmental Heath-Disaster and Response, 18
NEW SOLUTIONS 3, 4 (2008).
26. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11-
347, 124 Stat. 3623 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42, and 49
U.S.C. (2012)).
27. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 879 F. Supp. 2d 396, 399-400
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
28. BIRNBAUM, supra note 4, at 1.
29. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 4; see Kimberly Gordy, The
911 Cancer Conundrum: The Law, Policy, & Politics of the Zadroga Act, 37
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they were present and participated in the post-9/11 cleanup efforts,
claimants must also submit a specific medical diagnosis reporting
- - --30their injury or illness.
The structure of the Act consists of two parts: (1) The World Trade
Center Health Program, which serves to monitor and provide
treatment for responders and others affected by the air pollution at
Ground Zero -as many as 110,000 responders and survivors may
be eligible for this program 32-and (2) the victim compensation fund,
which provides funding for wage and economic losses that stem from
Ground Zero-related illnesses resulting from exposure to the toxic air
and debris. 33 In May 2011, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder
appointed Sheila Birnbaum as the new Special Master of the Fund.34
Her responsibilities include distributing $875 million of the $4.3
billion fund within the first five years of the law's existence, deciding
the award to each respondent, and writing regulations related to the
compensation fund.35
Similar to its first incarnation, the victim compensation portion
reopened under the Zadroga Act continues to serve as a substitute for
potential lawsuits against entities ranging from the U.S. government
and World Trade Center property owners to the Port Authority of
New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.36 It specifically acts as
an alternative to potential class action toxic tort litigation under the
premise that it is the more efficient and effective solution for
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 33 (2012) (providing background on the Zadroga Act);
Jamie Guzzardo, 10,000 Claims Over 911 Illness, Injuries Settled, CNN (Mar. 11,
2010, 10:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/03/11 /world.trade.center.suit.
30. Gordy, supra note 29, at 65.
31. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 §§ 101, 42
U.S.C. 300mm to 300mm-61.
32. James L. Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act, CITY OF NEW YORK,
http://home.nyc.gov/html/doh/wtc/html/health compensation/health
compensation act.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
33. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 § 201, 49
U.S.C. § 40101 note (2011).
34. General Program Information, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION
FUND, http://www.vcf.gov/genProgramlnfo.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
35. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 63; Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Obama Signs Bill to Help 911 Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, at Al7.
36. Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005).
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compensating victims.3 7 The next section will begin to explain how
compensation funds align with the goals of corrective justice and
address the obstacles that hinder success for plaintiffs through
traditional tort litigation.
II. WHERE Toxic TORT LITIGATION FALLS SHORT
A. Governmental Immunity
A compensation fund is in part designed to relieve the plaintiffs-
the victims and their families-of navigating through and possibly
failing under the traditional legal system.38 This alternative method
for damages recovery has been particularly beneficial to victims of
the September 11th terrorist attacks since broad tort liability would
have most likely been an unavailable claim for them. 39 In general,
victims of these types of national calamities traditionally have had no
right to recover damages or receive compensation from the
40government even if the government is at fault. Public sites, such as
bridges, airports, and subway stations, fall under the purview of
41public safety agencies. Claims for injuries resulting from a security
failure at one of these sites would most likely be unsuccessful under
37. Alvin K. Hellerstein et al., Managerial Judging: The 911 Responders' Tort
Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127, 178 (2012).
38. See infra Part III.
39. Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A
Circumscribed Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 779-
82 (2003).
40. See Steitz v. City of Beacon, 64 N.E.2d 704, 706 (N.Y. 1945) ("An
intention to impose upon the city the crushing burden of such an obligation should
not be imputed to the Legislature in the absence of language clearly designed to
have that effect."); see generally Riss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y.
1968); Miller v. State, 467 N.E.2d 493, 495 (N.Y. 1984) ("Public entities remain
immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of their
governmental functions including police protection, unless the injured person
establishes a special relationship with the entity, which would create a specific duty
to protect that individual, and the individual relied on the performance of that
duty."); Bass v. City of New York, 330 N.Y.S.2d 569, 579 (App. Div. 1972) aff'd,
300 N.E.2d 154 (N.Y. 1973).
41. Rabin, supra note 39, at 777.
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42tort law because it is not within the realm of judicial review. The
same is true for injuries resulting from an intelligence failure by
federal agencies, 43 as highly discretionary functions conducted by
public agencies remain shielded from liability under the common law
principle of governmental immunity. 44 Even further, any possible
negligence on the part of the federal government for failing to
prevent the terrorist attacks is arguably offset by the complex nature
of the duty of prioritizing the threats that all security agencies
-45
constantly receive.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) passed in 1946 reduced the
government's protection of general immunity from tort actions by
granting jurisdiction to federal district courts in civil actions "against
the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission" committed by employees of the
government in situations where the United States would be held
liable under local law if it were a private individual.46 However, the
discretionary function provides an exception to this liability.47 Soon
42. See, e.g., Doe v. City of New York, 890 N.Y.S.2d 548 (App. Div. 2009);
Rabin, supra note 39, at 778.
43. See, e.g., David Johnston, Threats and Responses: The Inquiry; Report of
9/11 Panel Cites Lapses by C.I.A. and F.B.I., N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2003, at Al.
44. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) provides that the FTCA is inapplicable "based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."; see Berkovitz v. United States,
486 U.S. 531, 535-40 (1988) (providing that the FTCA incorporates an exception
for discretionary functions to the waiver of U.S. governmental immunity for acts
that are deemed negligent. This protects governmental actions and decisions that
are based on a component of judgment and are concerned with public policy); see
also, e.g., Cuffy v. City of New York, 505 N.E.2d 937 (N.Y. 1987) (holding
according to precedent that a "special relationship" must exist in order to establish
a duty of police protection and outlining a series of factors to measure whether such
a relationship is in fact present).
45. Eric Lichtblau, 911 Report Cites Many Warnings About Hijackings, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/10/politics/
1 Oterror.html.
46. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West 2013); 14 N.Y. PRAc., NEW YORK LAW OF
TORTS § 9:21 (West 2013).
47. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979), where the
Supreme Court found that the FTCA cannot extend or narrow the sovereign
2014] 517
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after the implementation of the FTCA, the Supreme Court of the
United States found that the discretionary function exception could
apply to the initiation of programs and activities, and also to
"determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room
for policy judgment and decision there is discretion." 48 In United
States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, the plaintiff
(the owner of an aircraft) and his insurers filed suit against the United
States under the FTCA seeking recovery for damages arising from
the crash of the aircraft.49 The Supreme Court found that the Federal
Aviation Administration was not negligent in failing to verify
specific items during the certification process of the aircraft for
commercial use because the discretionary function exception
precluded such tort actions. 50 In United States v. Gaubert, the
Supreme Court was largely consistent with its previous decisions but
immunity waiver beyond what Congress has intended. The state of New York also
has waived its sovereign immunity in the Court of Claims Act, but exceptions to
the waiver of immunity exist, especially where a public entity has provided a public
function (like law enforcement) and where the act conducted by the public entity is
discretionary instead of ministerial. See also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197,
204 (1993), where the Supreme Court found the FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity did not apply to a wrongful death action against the United States.
48. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953). But see Rayonier Inc.
v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957), where the Supreme Court vacated judgments
in order for the district court to reconsider the complaints by examining whether
the allegations or other supporting material offered by plaintiffs were appropriately
sufficient to impose liability on a private individuals under Washington state laws;
see also Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (holding that
because the Coast Guard failed to perform duty under its due care requirement, the
United States was liable under the FTCA for damages caused to petitioners).
49. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
50. Id. See also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), decided four
years later which established a two-part test for determining when discretionary
function applies: (1) when a government agent acts in violation of mandatory
regulations, discretionary function immunity will not protect the United States
against actions arising from such a violation (2) if no mandatory regulations exist
and a government agent is acting upon discretion, the court will examine whether
the decision made considered issues of public policy and used policy judgment.
Only if such considerations were incorporated into the decision-making process can
the discretionary function exemption apply.
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added that the challenged government action must be the product of
-- 51policyjudgment.
Since Gaubert, the government's rate of successfully asserting
defense from liability under the discretionary function exception has
52increased to approximately three quarters of attempted cases. This
generally broad application of the discretionary function exception
may be one contributory reason for the creation of the victim
compensation fund. Such a fund is representative of a perceived
moral obligation that the government is satisfying where legal duties
fall short.53
B. Immunity Defense Relating to 911
The New York State Defense Emergency Act (SDEA) provides
tort immunity for government, volunteer agencies, other private
entities, or representatives of these groups that, in good faith, conduct
civil defense work against claims of death, injury, or property
damage resulting from a national attack.54 Article Nine explicitly
distinguishes this immunity from the rights of victims to collect
compensation for their losses under programs such as workers
compensation, benefit laws for firefighters and volunteer ambulance
workers, and pension law. 5
The U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York held
in In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation56 that the scope
of preemption under the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act did not preclude the application of state law
51. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325 (1991).
52. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF TERRORISM 56
(2005) ("And it seems highly probable that the magnitude of a September 11th type
attack would push the present day Court to declare security failures on the part of
the Government to be 'discretionary."'); Jonathan R. Bruno, Note, Immunity for
"Discretionary" Functions: A Proposal to Amend the Federal Tort Claims Act, 49
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 412 (2012).
53. SHAPO, supra note 52, at 58.
54. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 9193 (McKinney 2012).
55. Id.
56. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 521 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2008).
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immunity defenses even though it created a federal cause of action
for those directly affected by the events of September 11th.5 8 The
court also found that federal immunity doctrines were not
contradictory to the purpose of the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, and therefore should not be precluded
where their application was available. 59 Even more notably, Judge
Hellerstein declined "[t]o infer from the Act that all Plaintiffs [were]
entitled to compensation [because such an inference] would run
counter to the otherwise clearly expressed intent of Congress." 60
This provides another compelling reason why the 9/11 Fund was
first established. Congress did not intend to guarantee that
compensation would be awarded for victims who declined applying
for the 9/11 Fund or for those who were ineligible to receive
compensation through it.6 1 The 9/11 Fund, therefore, was designed in
part to ensure that victims received some sort of compensation,
particularly in the event that courts might not find potential
62defendants liable. As the next section will demonstrate, however,
the original 9/11 Fund did not account for injuries or death caused by
indirect consequences of the terrorist attacks on that fateful day,
namely exposure to toxic fumes at the crash sites during the cleanup
process.
C. Health and Safety Standards
Under the New York Labor Law, adequate protections are required
63to be provided for workers by the agent and lessee of work sites.
57. Id. at 545 ("Nothing in the Act or its legislative history suggests that
defenses against potential lawsuits are prohibited.").
58. Id. at 520 (the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act "did
not preempt otherwise applicable state law immunity defenses.").
59. Id. at 546.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 545.
62. Senator John McCain expressed this notion during the Congressional debate
over the 9/11 Fund: "To ensure that the victims and families of victims who were
physically injured or killed on September 11th are compensated even if courts
determine that the airlines and any other potential corporate defendants are not
liable for the harm . . . the [Act] also creates a victims' compensation fund." 147
Cong. Rec. 17,511 (2001) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
63. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 200(1) (McKinney 2009).
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Because they were ordered away from their premises soon after the
terrorist attacks, and were therefore unable to exercise the degree of
supervision necessary for liability under statute, it was found that
lessees at the World Trade Center, the "[m]anaging agent for a lessee
of World Trade Center, and [the] utility company maintaining facility
under center, had no liability for toxic fumes exposure encountered
by workers performing removal and restoration work on site[,64
protecting them against any claims of negligence in allowing
65
exposure to occur.
Moments after the first tower was hit, New York City took
exclusive control over the World Trade Center complex and the
properties surrounding the area.66 On September 12th, the New York
City Department of Design and Construction (DDC) established a
command center in lower Manhattan directly next to the World Trade
Center and set up strict procedures for accessing the site.67 Although
the DCC coordinated the cleanup work at Ground Zero, it
collaborated with other city entities during the recovery process,
including the City Office of Emergency Management (OEM), the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and the owner of the
World Trade Center site. 68 Four private contractors, AMEC
Construction Management, Bovis Lend Lease, Tully Construction
Company, and Turner Construction Company, were soon hired to
lead recovery and demolition efforts at Ground Zero.69
Only a day after the terrorist attacks, New York City became the
primary entity responsible for developing and enforcing standards for
health and safety at Ground Zero. 70 Daily meetings with the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), NYPD,
New York City Fire Department (FDNY), OEM, and representatives
of the four primary contractors were held to ensure compliance with
standards and continue the organization of recovery efforts.n An
essential aspect of the health and safety procedures was the
64. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d. at 522.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 528.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 525.
69. Id. at 529.
70. Id. at 530.
71. Id.
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development of criteria for the use of personal protective equipment
(PPE).72 Within hours of the attacks, the FDNY instructed all of its
employees to wear respirators at the site.73 The New York City
Department of Health and the DDC became the principal entities
responsible for health and safety standards related to PPE use,
assuming responsibility for FDNY and NYPD personnel, and New
York City and contractor personnel, respectively.74 By September 20,
2001, the New York City Department of Health announced minimum
safety gear standards for any individual working at the site, and by
October 2001, an initial version of the Environmental Safety and
Health Plan, which addressed all issues related to worker safety at
Ground Zero, was distributed. As a component of the
Environmental Safety and Health Plan, the results of safety
compliance inspections were documented in frequent reports
76prepared by the DDC and published during the recovery process.
Throughout these reports, problems with PPE compliance, especially
-77
respirator use, were pervasive.
Once the President of the United States, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the Governor of New York, as well
as the mayor of New York City all declared states of emergency,
local and federal agencies were authorized to take the necessary
actions to aid New York City's recovery. Because President Bush
declared a state of emergency, 79 the Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) was activated, which
allows for the federal government to assist state and local
governments if resources have been exhausted and the local
government requests assistance during a disaster.80 After the terrorist
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 531.
75. See id. at 531 (discussing the September 21, 2001 New York City
Department of Health Order).
76. Id. at 532.
77. Id. at 532-33.
78. Id. at 527-28.
79. Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
80. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act §
101(b), 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b) (2012), which provides "an orderly and continuing
means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in
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attacks and at the request of the New York City Department of
Health, OSHA, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
Army Corps of Engineers all contributed technical and physical
assistance to New York City pursuant to the Federal Response Plan.
OSHA became the primary entity responsible for developing and
enforcing respirator requirements at Ground Zero, which included
recommending the types of filters that should be used with the
respirators, conducting atmospheric monitoring around the site to
determine the boundaries within which respirators must be used, and
distributing 131,000 respirators while providing fittings and training
for proper respirator use. 82 Its responsibilities did not include,
however, ensuring that workers at Ground Zero actually employed
respiratory equipment according to the announced safety standards;
this responsibility fell on the DDC and the private contractors. 83
The EPA, in conjunction with the New York City Department of
Environmental Protection, was responsible for managing and
overseeing the disposal of hazardous waste at Ground Zero,
monitoring ambient air and water, and producing and disseminating
reports which incorporated the results of thousands of environmental
tests conducted at the site.84 Similar to the authority limitations of
OSHA, although the EPA observed inconsistent compliance with its
safety recommendation, it lacked enforcement capabilities
concerning worker health policies for employees other than its own.85
Finally, the Army Corps of Engineers acted as the lead entity
responsible for implementing and enforcing health and safety
standards at Fresh Kills, which was used as a landfill for the debris
removed from Ground Zero. 86
carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result
from such disasters."
81. Id.; Eggen, supra note 20, at 431.
82. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
83. Id. at 535.
84. Id. at 535-36.
85. Id. at 536.
86. Anemona Hartocollis, Landfill Has 911 Remains, Medical Examiner
Wrote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/
24/nyregion/24remains.html.
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D. Failure to Warn
A report that was issued by the EPA Office of the Inspector
General cited an EPA press release on September 16, 2001 stating
that samples of ambient air quality and indoor air qualities in
downtown buildings met OSHA standards, asbestos levels found in
debris and dust at and around Ground Zero did not pose serious
health risks to the general public, and that it was safe for those who
worked in the financial district to return to work. 87 The report
referenced other press releases that took place that week which
suggested similar messages. 88 According to the EPA Inspector
General, however, over twenty-five percent of the dust samples
measured indicated asbestos levels that were a significant health
risk; 89 the EPA did not qualify its dominant positive message
regarding health risks with information regarding other harmful
substances;90 nor was any acknowledgment given to the fact that no
adequate long-term health projections could accurately be made
regarding the unprecedented condition of the disaster and the
inevitable combination of the toxic substances. 91 On the other hand,
the press releases also contained cautionary language with a special
note about the plan for continued monitoring by the EPA and
warnings for the "need to take certain cautionary measures-for
instance, to change air conditioning filters, sweep up debris, and wet
down buildings covered in debris to avoid it from becoming
airborne."92
In Lombardi v. Whitman, workers who suffered from or feared
they would suffer from respiratory conditions allegedly as a result of
their search, rescue, and cleanup efforts in the aftermath of
September 11th filed suit against the EPA and other federal officials
claiming, as many others did, that statements made by government
representatives misled them into believing that air quality at Ground
87. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT No.
2003-P-00012, EPA's RESPONSE TO THE WORLD TRADE CENTER COLLAPSE:
CHALLENGES, SUCCESSES, AND AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT 85 (2003), http://
www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2003/WTC report 20030821.pdf.
88. Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 76-77 (2d Cir. 2007).
89. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 87, at 14.
90. Id. at 9-11.
91. Id. at 9-13.
92. Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 77.
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Zero did not pose any serious health risks. 93 Because the
Constitution does not explicitly allow for a remedy to violations by
federal officials, and sovereign immunity prevents damages from
being claimed against the federal government unless a special
relationship exists between the government and the victim, the option
for redress is only available if a federal agent, who is acting under
color of federal authority, has deprived the plaintiff in an individual
capacity of a constitutional right. 94 The court found that the
representative agency officials did not violate any substantive due
process rights because there was no intent to cause arbitrary harm
that would shock the conscience. 95 In its explanation, the court
acknowledged the extremely difficult competing obligations the
federal and local government, in addition to its agencies and
representatives, faced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. 96
The court in Lombardi reasoned that "it is not enough for a
plaintiff to allege that a government actor failed to protect an
individual from a known danger of bodily harm or failed to warn the
individual of that danger." 97 The court even found that the causal
connection between the government's optimistic statements about the
environment near Ground Zero and the plaintiffs' exposure to toxic
substances was debatable, citing the Supreme Court in Martinez v.
California which held that a governmental decision that merely
impacts the probability that a death will occur as a result of a
particular situation cannot be categorized as state action depriving an
individual of life simply because it has the potential to instigate
events that will ultimately lead to the death of the plaintiff.9 8
93. Id. at 75.
94. Id. at 78 (this is referred to as a Bivens action for damages against a federal
agent, named after Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), where the Supreme Court found a federal cause of
action for damages because of a federal agent's violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
95. Id. at 85.
96. Id. at 82-83.
97. Id. at 79 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992)
(finding an absence of a due process violation when the city allegedly failed to
adequately train or warn its sanitation workers of potential and known dangers that
resulted in one worker's death by asphyxiation)).
98. Id. at 81 (citing Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 281 (1980)).
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Due to this precedent, as well as the protective shield of
governmental immunity, it would most likely be difficult for an
individual to recover damages for the government's
misrepresentation of the air quality at Ground Zero following the
terrorist attacks. This again supports the notion that a victim
compensation fund fills the gaps that traditional litigation leaves in
regards to grievances experienced by those who contributed to the
cleanup process. With this analysis it is also important to consider
that if traditional tort recovery does not allow victories for these
types of plaintiffs, does a compensation fund in fact circumvent the
goals of our legal system?
E. Individual Responsibility
During the cleanup process following September 11th, each
volunteer at Ground Zero had the choice to wear a lightweight gas
mask when entering the smoking, toxic cloud. 99 Why should a
compensation fund account for such a personal misstep?100 Despite
the EPA's allegedly misleading statements regarding the air quality
at Ground Zero, significant efforts were in fact made by various
public and private parties to encourage emergency responders and
cleanup personnel to use respiratory protection equipment. 101
Obvious physical evidence, such as the presence of unrelenting fires
and a gigantic dust cloud lasting for months after the attacks, also
99. Howard, supra note 21, at 77.
100. The dissent in Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. Co.
similarly explores this question by citing Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L.
Ry. Co., 96 F. 298, 304 (6th Cir. 1899) ('Assumption of risk and contributory
negligence approximate where the danger is so obvious and imminent that no
ordinarily prudent man would assume the risk of injury therefrom. But where the
danger, though present and appreciated, is one which many men are in the habit of
assuming, and which prudent men who must earn a living are willing to assume for
extra compensation, one who assumes the risk cannot be said to be guilty of
contributory negligence if, having in view the risk of danger assumed, he uses care
reasonably commensurate with the risk to avoid injurious consequences. One who
does not use such care, and who, by reason thereof suffers injury, is guilty of
contributory negligence, and cannot recover, because he, and not the master,
causes the injury, or because they jointly cause it."') Schlemmer v. Buffalo,
Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1907) (Brewer, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
101. Howard, supra note 21, at 77.
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should have provided enough reasonable notice of the dangerous air
quality.102
In addition to actively promoting the use of respirators amongst
responders, the World Trade Center contractors and subcontractors,
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the New
York State Department of Labor, OSHA, FDNY, NYPD, Port
Authority, and other entities even provided respirator fit testing to
encourage their use.103 One of the problems, however, was that a
noteworthy percentage of responders opted to bypass the use of this
equipment during the first few weeks following the attacks when
environmental toxin levels were at their highest. 104 On the other
hand, if personal protective equipment and training practices were
not adequate during this period due to a governmental oversight, 105
this certainly should be addressed in preparation for future attacks or
other long-duration disasters where such equipment must be
available.
F. Assumption of Risk and the Firefighter's Rule
Another rule within the tort legal system that often limits a
plaintiffs recovery against a negligent defendant is the "assumption
of risk."'106 A plaintiff is said to have assumed the risk of certain harm
if he voluntarily consented to take his chances that harm will
occur.107 Traditionally, the plaintiff would have been completely
barred from recovery if assumption is indeed shown, but because the
doctrine is no longer an absolute defense, it is necessary to consider
102. Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 75.
103. Howard, supra note 21, at 77.
104. Id. at 72, 77.
105. BRIAN A. JACKSON ET AL., PROTECTING EMERGENCY RESPONDERS:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS 22-24 (2002), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/conf proceedings/2006/CF176.pdf.
106. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 2013); W. E. Shipley, Annotation,
Necessity and Manner of Pleading Assumption of Risk as a Defense, 59 A.L.R.2D
239 (originally published in 1958).
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. b, c (1965); see also
Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986).
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the risks assumed by the plaintiff in context of duty owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant. 08
Because firefighters, police officers, and other similar
professionals assume the hazards that are known to be present or that
can be anticipated by the traditional duties of an emergency
responder, the assumption of risk doctrine is said to be the basis for
the firefighter's rule. 109 This rule precludes a legal duty of care by a
premises owner to emergency responders.1 10 Under traditional tort
law, recovery has been denied to emergency responders seeking tort
damages for injuries sustained at the emergency site. 1
The idea behind this principle is that as compared to the general
public, firefighters and other emergency responders have certain
skills and are specifically trained to encounter hazards that may arise
in the situations that demand their services. In Madonna v. American
Airlines, Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in
part that because the officer plaintiff was engaged in a specific duty
that increased risk of injury, he was barred from recovery on a
negligence claim by New York's firefighter's rule. 112 In 1996, New
108. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1411 (McKinney 2013); see, e.g., Davidoff ex rel. Davidoff
v. Metro. Baseball Club, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 1219, 1220 (N.Y. 1984).
109. Neighbarger v. Irwin Indus., 882 P.2d 347, 352 (Cal. 1994) (finding that the
firefighter's rule is "an example of the proper application of the doctrine of
assumption of the risk. . . ."); Seibert Sec. Servs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 514, 517 n.4 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1993) (finding that the
firefighter's rule is an example of assumption of risk (citing Donohue v. San
Francisco Hous. Auth., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)); see also City of
Redlands v. Sorensen, 221 Cal. Rptr. 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Terhell v. Am.
Commonwealth Assocs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 256, 257 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
110. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Sunmark Indus., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Ky. 1986)
(citing Buren v. Midwest Indus., Inc., 380 S.W.2d 96, 97-98 (Ky. 1964)).
111. Except in cases where a property owner willfully or knowingly causes the
harm. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 61,
429-30 (5th ed. 1984).
112. Madonna v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 82 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1996). Further, the
court held that New York General Municipal Law section 205-e shall mitigate the
firefighter's rule if injuries result from a party's negligence in "failing to comply
with the requirements of any of the statutes, ordinances, rules, orders and
requirements of the federal, state, county, village, town or city governments." Id.;
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-e(1) (McKinney 1996). However, a plaintiff can only
properly state a claim under section 205-e by identifying "the statute or ordinance
with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the
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York common lawll3 was superseded when section 11-106 of the
General Obligations Law was enacted allowing police officers and
firefighters to bring tort claims against the general public for most
injuries that occur in the line of duty.114 It is important to note,
however, that section 11-106 still bars tort claims against an
employer. 115 The determinative factor in deciding whether the
firefighter's rule should be applied assesses the link between the
illness or injury at issue and the risks which first responders are
expected to assume on the job. 116 In the case of toxic torts, the
"willful and wanton misconduct" exception to the firefighter's rule
may allow emergency responders to recover for injury, but only if the
defendant handled the toxic chemicals causing injury or illness
beyond a level of negligence. 1
firefighter [or police officer] was injured, and set forth those facts from which it
may be inferred that the defendant's negligence directly or indirectly caused the
harm." Zanghi v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Comm'n, 649 N.E.2d 1167, 1173 (N.Y.
1995) (construing section 205-a as including a comparable provision to section
205-e as it pertains to firefighters by providing a statutory cause of action for
firefighters and their survivors regarding line-of-duty injuries or death sustained
from defendant's negligent noncompliance of any governmental statutes or other
regulations).
113. Santangelo v. State, 521 N.E.2d 770, 772 (N.Y. 1988) (finding that
firefighters and police officers cannot recover for injuries arising from "negligence
in the very situations that create the occasion for their services."); Kenavan v. City
of New York, 517 N.E.2d 872, 874 (N.Y. 1987).
114. Giuffrida v. Citibank Corp., 790 N.E.2d 772, 776 (N.Y. 2003).
115. Id.; Williams v. City of New York, 811 N.E.2d 1103, 1108 (N.Y. 2004).
116. Cooper v. City of New York, 619 N.E.2d 369, 371 (N.Y. 1993).
117. Such an exception was adequately asserted in Mahoney v. Carus Chem. Co.,
510 A.2d 4, 12 (N.J. 1986) where the defendant, a manufacturer of a chemical that
ultimately caused injury to the plaintiff through exposure, was aware that its
product increased the flammability of combustible materials; that it had
communicated privately and publicly its conclusion that the danger of spontaneous
combustion was so great that the use of fiber containers should cease; and that it
nonetheless shipped 100 fiber containers of the chemical to the warehouse where
the fire in which the plaintiff was injured occurred. This exception is arguably
inapplicable to the circumstances at Ground Zero because of the indefinite
defendants, and because it would be difficult to prove that the property owners or
other potential defendants acted wantonly in regards to the chemicals that happened
to be released and unintentionally fuse in the air as a result of the collapse of
multiple skyscraper buildings. Therefore, it can be argued that the firefighter's rule
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However, in Furch v. General Electric Co., the court found that the
firefighter's rule did not apply where defendant negligently installed
materials that released toxic substances during the fire, injuring
firefighters responding at the scene. 1 The court found that the
installation was "sufficiently separate and apart from the negligence
which occasioned the emergency for which plaintiffs were
summoned," and therefore recovery was not barred. 19 In this case,
the firefighters had no knowledge that exposure to toxic substances
was a risk inherent in the response to this particular emergency.120
The court continued by drawing a noteworthy distinction: "To be
contrasted is the situation where the emergency itself patently
involves the risk of exposure to toxic substances."1 2 1 However, in
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, the Supreme Court of Virginia found
the firefighter's rule to be inapplicable regarding the recovery of
rescue squad members and others who were injured as a result of
exposure to ultrahazardous chemicals released during disposal
efforts.122 This court based its decision on the notions that it is highly
unusual for an extremely hazardous chemical to be released into the
air by accident and that rescue workers would not be aware of the
probability of such an occurrence.123 Because this was considered
highly unusual, the risk was unforeseeable and was not included
under those inherently involved in a firefighter's occupation.
Therefore, the firefighter's rule did not apply. 124
The situation that gave rise to the reopened 9/11 Fund differs from
that in Philip Morris for two compelling reasons. First, the toxins at
Ground Zero were not necessarily released by any unusual accident.
Second, it is arguably obvious that the collapse and destruction of the
Twin Towers and other buildings in lower Manhattan, as well as the
can be employed to toxic torts suffered by emergency responders exposed to toxins
during the cleanup.
118. Furch v. Gen. Elec. Co., 535 N.Y.S.2d 182 (App. Div. 1988).
119. Id. at 184.
120. Id.
121. Id. (citing Calvert v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 694 P.2d 433 (Kan. 1985) and
Rowland v. Shell Oil Co., 224 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. App. 1986). In Calvert, the
firefighter's rule barred recovery by firefighters who were exposed to toxic
substances while responding to chemical spills and leaks).
122. Philip Morris, Inc. v. Emerson, 368 S.E.2d 268, 268 (Va. 1988).
123. Id. 281-82.
124. Id.
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incineration of technology equipment, chemicals, insulation, human
flesh, and every other item contained within these buildings would
mix together into one toxic brew that would potentially be hazardous
to health. 125 As the court in Furch made clear, "risk of exposure to
toxic substances is an unfortunate consequence of modern
technology." 126 The cleanup and recovery scene to which the
emergency personnel responded in the aftermath of September 11th
was a clear danger, and risk of exposure to harmful toxins was
reasonably apparent to those involved in the cleanup. 127
Some courts have found, however, that even in emergency
situations where first responders and other personnel should be aware
of the risk, liability for independent negligence that has heightened
the risk may exist, especially in cases where the defendant
misrepresented the gravity of the hazard. 12 8 In fact, most jurisdictions
have permitted recovery where the failure to warn resulted in the
death or injury of a firefighter or other emergency personnel. 129
G. Alternative Sources of Compensation for Emergency Responders
One justification for the firefighter's rule is that firefighters and
"police officers receive appropriate compensation from the public
which reflects the risk inherent in their work."l30 Various federal and
state programs are already in place to compensate officers who are
killed in the line of duty. The Department of Justice pays $250,000 to
the eligible survivors of police and fire personnel who are killed in
125. For example, "[t]he term 'World Trade Center cough' quickly entered the
language as referring to a recurrent cough, characteristic among site workers, that
sometimes did not resolve, and was followed later in many cases by a diagnosis of
a respiratory condition." Stephenson v. City of New York, 812 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803
(Sup. Ct. 2005).
126. Furch, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 184.
127. Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2007).
128. See, e.g., Lipson v. Super. Ct., 644 P.2d 822 (Cal. 1982).
129. Id. at 828; see also Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 206 A.2d 148, 153 (Md. 1965);
Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 37th St. Corp., 31 N.E.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. 1940); Shypulski
v. Waldorf Paper Prods. Co., 45 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Minn. 1951).
130. City of Sacramento v. Sup. Ct., 182 Cal. Rptr. 443, 446 (Cal. App. 3d Dist.
1982). Rescue workers, such as firefighters and police, arguably have excellent
disability and health benefits, see, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, Lessons to Be Learned:
The Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 821, 823 (2003).
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the line of duty.131 The City of New York provides surviving spouses
of officers killed in the line of duty a full pension equivalent to the
lost salary in addition to a stipend worth the decedent's annual salary
and a $25,000 death benefit. 132 Full scholarships to New York State
universities are also awarded to the decedent's children. 133
In the Final Report of the Special Master for the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Feinberg wrote that he
referenced the amount of compensation found under these existing
federal programs in order to determine an appropriate amount for the
noneconomic loss award provided to the families of deceased victims
under the 9/11 Fund. 134 It was ultimately decided that the
noneconomic loss award would be $250,000 for victims who died on
September 11th, an amount roughly equivalent to that provided for
under these federal programs.135 The following section explores why
these awards are deemed to effectively reflect the goals of corrective
justice in the context of a national collective perspective.
III. COMPENSATION FUNDS AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO ToxIc TORT
LITIGATION
A. The National Response to September 11th
There are three most notable social responses to injuries through
the legal system; the first is preemptive, the second is punitive, and
131. Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Construction and Application of Public Safety
Officers'Benefits Act (PSOBA), 42 U.S.C.A §§ 3796 to 3796d- 7, 23 A.L.R. FED. 2D
129 (originally published in 2007) ("The Public Safety Officers' Benefits Act has
most frequently been applied in cases involving firefighters and police officers,
often in similar circumstances.").
132. David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Families;
Gifts to Rescuers Divide Survivors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at Al; Robert
Ingrassia, Police & Fire Widows to Get $2M WTC Victims'Kin to Share in $500M,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 16, 2002, at 8.
133. Barstow & Henriques, supra note 132.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2012); FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 40.
135. See 38 U.S.C. §1967 (2012) (providing insurance coverage of $400,000 for
members of the uniformed forces who qualify); 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2013)
(providing a $250,000 benefit for public safety officers who have died as a direct
and proximate result of a physical injury sustained in the line of duty); FEINBERG
ET AL., supra note 11, at 40.
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the third is compensatory.136 The last type uses a method of loss
- - 137--
spreading and consists of a strong social justice component. This is
reflected in compensation funds established by the government for
victims of domestic terrorism, and represents a communitarian
system of shared benefits. 138
One justification for originally creating the 9/11 Fund is that those
who died as a result of the terrorist attacks were viewed as victims of
a national tragedy. 139 As such, it was our duty as a nation to
compensate the loss of these fallen brothers and sisters. Because of
this, many scholars, as well as Feinberg himself, have held that the
Fund template should only be used in response to unique terrorist
events 140 and should not be used to provide relief for victims of
naturally occurring events and other such "acts of god."1 41 But these
events, like September 11th, arguably have had considerable impacts
on the national psyche as well.142
At a minimum, some suggest that there should be no distinction
between the victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks and those
of other terrorist attacks, such as the first attack on the World Trade
Center in 1993, the Oklahoma City federal office bombing, 143 the
attacks on the USS Cole in Yemen, the embassy bombing in Kenya,
or the terrorist attack of the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi. Through this
perspective, the 9/11 Fund is inherently unfair to victims of other
136. SHAPO, supra note 52, at 89.
137. Id. at 47.
138. Id.
139. Ackerman, supra note 16, at 144; George W. Conk, Will the Post 911
WorldBe a Post-Tort World?, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 175, 181 (2007).
140. See generally FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 11; Kenneth R. Feinberg, The
Building Blocks of Successful Victim Compensation Programs, 20 OHIo ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 273, 276-77 (2005); Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, The
Case for Specially Compensating the Victims of Terrorist Acts: An Assessment, 35
HOFSTRA L. REV. 901, 913 (2007).
141. Rabin & Sugarman, supra note 140, at 912-14.
142. These events might include Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, or other
such natural disasters. See id. at 914 (suggesting that it is no less difficult to argue
compensation for victims of terrorist attack as compared to victims of natural
disasters; while the latter may be self-insured for property damage, it is just as
likely that traditional tort remedies will be inadequate regarding compensation for
their injury or death).
143. A Nation Challenged: The Victims; Oklahomans Questioning Sept. 11 Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at B8.
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terrorist events, either on American soil or abroad, where American
citizens and diplomats have been victims. In light of these tragic
events, the government played only a minimal role in the
compensation of the bereaved and injured. 144 But Feinberg repeatedly
reminded the public and legal community that the 9/11 Fund was not
intended to be a model for tort reform, nor a template for
compensation programs enacted after any future terrorist attacks or
other such national tragedies. 145 What, then, makes these terrorist
attacks any different from September 11th? Are the lives lost to prior
or future attacks any less valuable than those lost on that fateful day
in 2001?
It may be possible that the only effective way to narrow the scope
of public compensation in the aftermath of these types of incidents is
to evaluate the tragedy from the perspective of the community, by
considering the psychic scars of the nation as a whole.146 This was
not only a mass injury, but also one caused by an act of terrorism,
which by its very name, operates to inspire a deep and unexpected
fear in the hearts and minds of its casualties.147 Every American was
a casualty in this sense, even though only approximately 3,000 of us
144. September 11th Compensation: The Impossibility of Making Whole,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2003, at 65.
145. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE WORTH? THE UNPRECEDENTED
EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, at 178 (2005) ("It would be a
mistake for Congress or the public to take the 9/11 fund as ... a model in the event
of future attacks.") [hereinafter FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?]; Kenneth R.
Feinberg, Negotiating the September ]] Victim Compensation Fund of 2001: Mass
Tort Resolution Without Litigation, 19 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 21, 29 (2005) ("9/11
was unique and gave rise to a unique response. That is the only way, I think, to
explain it.").
146. See generally Joel B. Eisen, The Trajectory of "Normal" After 9/11:
Trauma, Recovery and Post-Traumatic Societal Adaptation, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 499 (2003); Shankar Vedantam, After Sept. 11, Psychic Wounds Slow to Heal,
WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2002, at A3.
147. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2013) (an individual is considered
"guilty of a crime of terrorism when, with intent to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population, influence the policy of a unit of government by intimidation or
coercion, or affect the conduct of a unit of government by murder, assassination or
kidnapping, he or she commits a specified offense.").
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were actually lost.148 The intensive media and television coverage
correspondingly had an impact on the nation's attitude towards the
victims, as well as the influence of prominent politicians on the
response of a no-fault fund. 149 If measured only through this
perspective, the 9/11 victims deserved public compensation because
Congress, the public, and the nation as a whole deemed the
magnitude and scope of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 unique and
greater than any previous act of terrorism.1 50
In the traditional tort system, line drawing often distinguishes
victims by granting compensation to some while none to others. 151
As is the case across the legal spectrum of litigation, some claimants
inevitably walk away from the courthouse empty-handed. So while
the compensation fund varies the award amounts depending on the
individual, it is better than seeking relief through the traditional tort
system because it at least provides some form of compensation to all
eligible individuals who take advantage of the program. 152 For
example, public perception may view it an intolerable outcome if
148. See, e.g., In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520,
526 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 521 F.3d 169 (2d Cir.
2008).
149. Morrison, supra note 130, at 822.
150. Feinberg, supra note 14.
151. See, e.g., Darden ex rel. Darden v. Watkins, 845 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1988)
(stating when resolving a state tort claim, the decision of the case turns on line-
drawing); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985)
(finding that because a line must be drawn somewhere, the economic-loss rule is
generally applicable and predictable); see also PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean
Dredging, 447 So.2d 1058, 1061-62 (La. 1984) ("Because the list of possible
victims and the extent of economic damages might be expanded indefinitely, the
court necessarily makes a policy decision on the limitation of recovery of
damages.").
152. Although some might claim otherwise, the fact that ninety-seven percent of
eligible claimants opted to apply for the fund does not necessarily prove that
compensation funds are a better alternative to tort litigation. Maybe many chose the
fund simply because a large sum of money was essentially guaranteed to each
eligible claimant, not because the results are an accurate representation of those
attained through the traditional tort system. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The
Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade Center Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 EMoRY L.J. 1315, 1319 (2004) (stating "it is sobering to
realize that every World Trade Center claimant could have chosen the tort litigation
system but that [at least] 95% did not.").
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only the victims in the planes were able to recover through the tort
system and not the victims on the ground or the occupants within the
buildings.153 The special character of the events surrounding the
deaths on September 11th creates public sensitivity to a whole
community of victims.154 As mentioned above, however, this national
collective perspective that fueled the creation of the original 9/11
Fund did not contemplate the devastating health consequences that
would result from exposure to toxins during the cleanup process. It
can be argued that a different standard should have guided the
reopened 9/11 Fund under the Zadroga Act for reasons elaborated
upon below.
B. Toxins at Ground Zero
It can sometimes take decades to understand the medical
consequences and diseases that will develop as a result of an
environmental event.155 There is currently no hard scientific evidence
linking certain diseases with exposure to the toxic cloud at Ground
Zero, and it is difficult to determine whether cancers and other
similar illnesses are causally related to exposure to the toxins, or just
temporally related.156
With any toxic tort action, there are many controversial and
complex proximity and causation issues that must be resolved. 15 In
fact, one of the reasons the Agent Orange Settlement Fund was
enacted was to avoid settlement and potentially unfair compensation
awards since it was determined to be extremely difficult for
individual veterans to prove that an injury or illness was directly
linked to exposure to the chemicals. 158 While the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that Vietnam veteran plaintiffs
153. Rabin, supra note 39, at 777.
154. Id.
155. See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific
Evidence After Daubert, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 889, 895-903 (1994).
156. Howard, supra note 21, at 89-90.
157. See generally Amy D. Paul, Rethinking Oil Spill Compensation Schemes:
The Causation Inquiry, 9 LoY. MAR. L.J. 137 (2011).
158. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT?: FAIR COMPENSATION AFTER
TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL xiii (2012); see also In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 172 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding "[t]he problems of
proving causation [were] substantial.").
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did actually suffer and that many deserved help from the government,
it also found that these plaintiffs simply could not obtain aid through
suit against private corporations primarily because credible evidence
did not exist to establish causation between exposure to Agent
Orange and the various illnesses and injuries from which they
allegedly suffered. 159 Similarly, it is difficult to verify with certainty
that the health conditions of claimants under the renewed 9/11 Fund
were caused directly by the air pollution and debris removal
following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.
Of those who were exposed to the volatile organic compounds and
inhaled particulate chemicals from the toxic mixture that was
generated on September 11, 2001, some may have had a
predisposition that either accelerated or directly and singularly
caused the particular cancer or respiratory disease. Forty-two percent
of registry enrollees for compensation under the renewed 9/11 Fund
were reported to have been smokers prior to or at the time of their
enrollment, which may have had an effect on their health-especially
as it pertains to respiratory illnesses and cancer-regardless of
exposure to the air at Ground Zero. 160 Additionally, some claimants
may have been more prone to developing such diseases than others
due to different genetic or biological makeup, and individual
lifestyles could have also contributed to the cause, especially because
cancer is a relatively common disease and cause of death in the
United States. In an interesting twist of events, it has even been
suggested that the death of the man whose name inspired the Zadroga
Act was not directly linked to the environmental issues at the site. 161
159. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d at 172.
160. Mark Farfel et al., An Overview of 911 Experiences and Respiratory and
Mental Health Conditions among World Trade Center Health Registry Enrollees,
85 J. URB. HEALTH 880, 891 (2008).
161. See generally William M. Sage, Brand New Law! The Need to Market
Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2121 (2011); Anthony DePalma, City Says
Prescription Misuse Caused Death of Detective Who Worked at 911 Site, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at B3 (suggesting that James Zadroga's death was caused by
prescription drugs and not exposure to toxins at Ground Zero); Paul H. B. Shin,
WTC Death-Link Doubt: Health Chief Is Skeptical on Hero's Ills, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Apr. 15, 2006, at 6; Raymond Hernandez, House Passes 9/11 Health Care
Bill, N.Y. TIMES CITY RooM (Sept. 29, 2010, 3:46 PM), http://
cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/91 1-health-care-bill-passes (indicating
2014] 537
538 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
In fact, it was first determined that the link between Ground Zero's
toxic cloud and the cancers contracted by individuals who sacrificed
their time to rebuild lower Manhattan was too indefinite.162 Because
no formal medical proof could substantiate this connection, those
suffering from cancer were not originally included under the Zadroga
Act. 163 Nevertheless, after receiving recommendation from the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and from an
advisory committee comprised of union officials, doctors, and
experts, the Zadroga Act was ultimately expanded to include cancer
on the list of ailments covered by the $4.3 billion program.164
Even the most recent studies, however, are determining that there
is no clear link between exposure to the toxic air at Ground Zero and
the cancers allegedly contracted as a result.165 One particular study
was conducted by Jiehui Li of the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene involving the largest group of individuals
to date (over 55,700 people, including recovery workers at Ground
Zero, and students, workers, and residents present in lower
that the name given to the legislation is "deceptive" since Zadroga's death was not
"directly related to the 9/11 attacks.").
162. The National Institute for Occupational Health study that was made public a
day before Shelia Birnbaum held the first of a series of three "town hall meetings"
stated that no evidence was found linking cancer and exposure to toxins at Ground
Zero. See, e.g., Sydney Ember, Study Suggests Higher Cancer Risk for 911
Firefighters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011, at Al7.
163. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 29.
164. Federal Health Officials Propose Free Cancer Care for 911 First
Responders, CBS NEWS (June 8, 2012, 5:32 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
504763 162-57449857-10391704/federal-health-officials-propose-free-cancer-
care-for-9- 11-first-responders.
165. See Anemona Hartocollis, City Study Finds No Clear Link between 911
Debris and Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at Al (quoting Dr. Alfred I.
Neugut, an oncologist and professor of epidemiology at the Mailman School of
Public Health at Columbia University, who "said he sympathized with people who
had cancer they attributed to the disaster," but "that their emotional response was
not necessarily valid scientifically." He continued by saying that .' [t]he 9/11 attack
was a terrible thing, but it doesn't cause everything in the world,"' and that
"'[c]ancer is a very specific outcome, and in most exposures, you have to be
exposed for an extended time before you get the cancer."'); see generally Jiehui Li
et al., Association between World Trade Center Exposure and Excess Cancer Risk,
308 JAMA 2479 (2012).
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Manhattan during the recovery process).166 The study did not find a
significant increase of cancer rates among the population exposed to
the toxins as compared to the general population, and the incidence
of cancer among those who were exposed at a more intense rate was
not any higher than among those who were exposed to a lesser
degree. 167 Although this Note cannot fully address the issue of
causation of injuries through exposure to toxic air, it is important to
briefly consider how to factor this causation ambiguity into the
application of compensation funds.
C. The Issue of Causation in Tort Cases
In order to demonstrate a defendant's liability in tort actions, a
plaintiff must prove both actual and proximate causation.168 Risk of
harm resulting from the defendant's tortious action must have been
foreseeable, and independent intervening forces must not have been
present. 169 The defendant is usually not liable, however, for
consequences that are very unforeseeable. 170
In this way, it can be argued that inadequate screening at airports
or unsecure flight decks led to the airline hijackings, and thus
negligence liability was present on September 11th. The airlines
and even the building owners, however, might have a foreseeability
defense against potential claims brought by survivors of those who
166. See generally Li et al., supra note 165.
167. Id.
168. See DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY §
12:2 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the "but-for" test and "substantial-factor" test to
establish actual causation).
169. Gordon v. E. Ry. Supply, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 912, 916 (N.Y. 1993)
("Defendants are liable for all normal and foreseeable consequences of their acts."
In order "[t]o establish a prima facie case plaintiff need not demonstrate that the
precise manner in which the accident happened or the injuries occurred was
foreseeable; it is sufficient that he demonstrate that the risk of some injury from
defendants' conduct was foreseeable."); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 111,
§ 42, at 273, 281-82, 297.
170. See Lapidus v. State, 866 N.Y.S.2d 711, 722 (App. Div. 2008) (finding
when an event is "so improbable and unforeseeable as to constitute a superseding
event breaking the causal connection between the alleged negligence" and the
harm, "defendant's alleged negligence as the legal cause of the accident" is
replaced).
171. Rabin, supra note 39, at 773.
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perished in the buildings or at the crash sights. In other words, while
it is foreseeable that passengers may die from an airplane hijacking
resulting from inadequate safety measures, it is more difficult to
successfully argue in court that it is foreseeable that a hijacked
airplane may crash into occupied buildings killing those inside, or
even further, that the hijacked plane would crash into buildings
causing them to collapse resulting in death and major devastation on
the ground. 172 Even more removed from this foreseeability and
proximate cause principle is the idea that those who worked and
volunteered in the cleanup process would potentially be exposed to
harmful toxins resulting in injury or death.
On the other hand, in an action brought by survivors of victims and
victims of 9/11 against the airlines, airport security companies,
manufacturer of the aircrafts, and owners and operators of the
buildings that were destroyed, the District Court of the Southern
District of New York applied the common law of New York and
found that defendants had a duty to specific injured persons (as
opposed to the general public) to protect them against harm resulting
from the acts of third-party terrorists. 173 The court articulated that in
order to find duty, multiple factors are balanced 'including the
reasonable expectations of parties and society generally, the
proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or insurer-like
liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public
policies affecting the expansion or limitation of new channels of
liability. "174 "This judicial resistance to the expansion of duty grows
out of practical concerns both about potentially limitless liability and
about the unfairness of imposing liability for the acts of another." 17 5
The court reasoned that the need for a determinate pool of plaintiffs
stems from an effort to avoid a proliferation of claims. 176
172. Id. at 774.
173. See generally In re September 11 Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d 279 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). Here, the court also reasoned that in New York, establishing a duty is a legal
and policy based assertion reserved for judges. Id. at 290 (citing Palka v.
Servicemaster Mgmt. Servs. Corp., 634 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. 1994)).
174. Id. at 290.
175. Id.
176. Id.
[VOL. XXV
TERRORISM AND MASS TOXIC TORTS
New York common law has always connected duty with
foreseeability. 177 However, foreseeability of the exact manner of
harm is not required of the defendant in order for negligence to still
exist; only foreseeability of the general nature of harm is required.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
the airplane crashes amounted to a general nature of harm that should
have been foreseeable to the aviation defendants. 179 While it may not
have been foreseeable that nineteen terrorists would hijack four
airplanes and drive them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon,
and a field in Pennsylvania, it should have been foreseeable on a
more general level that ground victims may be injured due to the
crash of a hijacked airplane.'so
The issue of Ground Zero toxic exposure makes a departure from
this foreseeability argument for several reasons. First, plaintiffs in the
litigated toxic tort cases did not name the airlines as defendants, but
instead focused mainly on the World Trade Center property and
government entities as liable parties. 181 Additionally, government
ineptitude and inadequate protective equipment were asserted as the
cause of action (events that occurred after the terrorist attack) as
opposed to actions that enabled terrorist acts, and because these were
toxic tort cases, the principal issue centered on acts or omissions
perpetrated by the defendants who failed to protect the safety and
ensure the well-being of the plaintiffs. 182 Even further, the scope of
damage was indeterminate, making the amount of future claims
unknown, especially when considering injuries that could be dormant
for years.183 By way of example, in 2004 the Eastern District of New
York followed the appellate court decisions 184 when it held that
177. See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
178. See generally Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y.
1980) (finding that a foreseeable intervening cause does not relieve the original
actor of liability for negligence).
179. In re September 1] Litig., 280 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
180. Id.
181. Eggen, supra note 20, at 445.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 385, 445.
184. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff'd
in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003) (finding that "(2) veterans could
collaterally attack prior class action to test application of res judicata to individuals
whose injuries did not manifest themselves until settlement funds were exhausted;
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plaintiffs who "discovered what they believe[d] to be their Agent
Orange-related diseases after the Agent Orange Fund was fully
expended" were not in fact bound by the settlement that created the
Fund in response to the class action.' 8 Finally, the causal connection
between the toxins at Ground Zero and claimant's injuries cannot be
scientifically proven.186 Because of these differences, this reopened
9/11 Fund compels a different level of scrutiny. While it is untimely
to address these concerns in the context of the Zadroga Act, this next
section will begin to carve out an alternative compensation plan for
victims of future terrorist attacks and other similar national
calamities.
IV. PRESENTING A PROPOSAL
When a commercial airline crash occurs, the tort system typically
addresses the issues of liability of the airline and compensation for
the victims in a reasonably efficient manner, and no serious effort has
been made to replace this mechanism with a no-fault recovery. The
crashes on September 11th differ from the typical commercial airline
crash, however, because of the number of people killed both on the
planes and on ground, the destruction caused at the crash sites, the
national and individual grief and trauma that ensued, 188 and the
subsequent effects on individuals exposed to the toxic cloud at
Ground Zero. This situation further contrasts from an ordinary mass
(3) veterans were not adequately represented in prior class action, such that it was
not [a] bar to their claims.").
185. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 404, 409
(E.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 517 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2008).
186. But see Mattis v. Carlon Elec. Prods., 295 F.3d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 2002),
where the court outlines a different standard of proof for causation ("To prove
causation in a toxic tort case, a plaintiff must show both that the alleged toxin is
capable of causing injuries like that suffered by the plaintiff in human beings
subjected to the same level of exposure as the plaintiff, and that the toxin was the
cause of the plaintiffs injury, however, to prove exposure, a plaintiff need not
produce a mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with levels of
harm; rather, a plaintiff need only make a threshold showing that he or she was
exposed to toxic levels known to cause the type of injuries he or she suffered.").
187. Rabin, supra note 39, at 774.
188. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Grief Procedure, and Justice: The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 465-66 (2003).
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tort case not only because most of the initial victims died, but also
because of the indeterminate defendants who were exposed to the
toxic cloud, and the potentially indefinite plaintiffs. 189 The imposition
of culpability on a tortfeasor for such harms could create "a liability
in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class."l 90
Those issues aside, the 9/11 Fund was created not only as a source
to console the community of victims, but in large part as a response
to a perceived need for an airline bailout and a plea to Congress by
the airlines for such assistance. 191 Insolvency of the potential
defendants was arguably the single greatest issue attributed to the
speed at which Congress enacted the Fund.192 So, while tort law is
founded on the concept of a deserving victim and a transgressing
defendant, a no-fault compensation fund adopts a social welfare
perspective that reimburses victims for their harms caused by a
defined activity or event while spreading the losses.1 93
In speedily pushing through a no-fault compensation scheme,
however, Congress did not adequately contemplate the consequences
of the Fund on future tort claimants or its applicability in the
aftermath of future terrorist attacks or similar national calamities.1 94
While it may be inappropriate to construct an exact plan for
189. This may be exemplified by the specifications of the Gulf Coast Claims
Facility where "[a]ny individual in Louisiana that can demonstrate a defined
financial loss around the time of the Deepwater Horizon disaster can make a claim,
and 'essentially any kind of business at all."' Richard Thompson, BP Settlement
Administrator Urges Those Affected by Oil Spill to File Claims, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 1, 2012, http://www.nola.com/business/index.ssf/
2012/11/opt-out deadline in bpoilspi.html.
190. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
191. Morrison, supra note 130, at 821.
192. Rabin, supra note 39, at 771. It is common for this factor to be the main
concern regarding successfully establishing liability in light of mass tort-provoked
bankruptcies, as experienced by the asbestos industry. Id. Additionally, because
Congress did not have to rationalize each component of the fund to the public,
unlike the process courts endure when arriving at a legal decision, the legislation
was passed quickly. See Morrison, supra note 130, at 823.
193. Matthew Diller, Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim
Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 733 (2003); Rabin, supra note 39, at
782.
194. Rabin, supra note 39, at 769.
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compensating victims of future attacks,1 95 opening a dialogue now
may be a useful first step in preparing for another event like
September 11th. 196 It is difficult to plan for the future, however,
because of the multitude of possible terrorist attacks that we may face
as a nation, all varying in degree of destruction. The detonation of a
dirty bomb, for example, may emit radiation that can contaminate its
surrounding area for scores of years, revealing new injuries only as
the years pass.197 If this event were to occur in a major city, how can
all victims be properly compensated in the wake of such persisting
devastation? What if the death toll of the next terrorist attack reaches
tens of thousands of individuals? We must even consider the
likelihood of future events of such magnitude with respect to the 9/11
Fund as "[tihere is now mounting evidence that the toxic collateral
effects of the World Trade Center attacks have the potential for
creating a legal-as well as human-cataclysm well into the
future." 98
A. An Alternative Template for a Standard ofResponse
The first step in designing a response template is to evaluate the
need for compensation of a national catastrophe based on a
community perspective as opposed to an individualistic
perspective.199 While we cannot exactly measure the totality of public
sentiment until the act of terrorism or disaster occurs, we can
formulate in advance of future attacks a basic template that can then
be applied and adjusted when the circumstances necessitate such a
response. This leads to a central question of this Note: if someone
195. Morrison, supra note 130, at 826.
196. Congress may opt to avoid passing any such laws unless compelled to under
the pressure of immediate circumstances. Id.
197. See, e.g., Glen Martin, Diablo Canyon Power Plant a Prime Terror Target;
Attack on Spent Fuel Rods Could Lead to Huge Radiation Release, S.F. CHRON.,
Mar. 17, 2003, at Al (describing how a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant has
the potential to result in devastating damages and incalculable costs arising from
the discharge of large amounts of radiation).
198. Eggen, supra note 20, at 384.
199. As mentioned above, Congress deemed the scale and scope of 9/11 to be
exceptional. It was greater than any prior act of terrorism and the community
response to it was strong and unified. The national psychic scars were deep and
remain so today.
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(namely the government and its taxpayers) should be held
responsible for compensating victims of terrorist attacks and other
similar catastrophes through compensation funds due to the nature of
the national trauma, what is the best method of doing so?200 The
following section will briefly outline a proposal by considering only
who should be compensated, the standard for determining the amount
of compensation, and how funding should be raised to accommodate
such a reparation scheme.
B. Who Should Be Compensated?
Hundreds of the city's bravest made the ultimate sacrifice on
September 11th and as a result of the following cleanup.201 These
were heroic individuals who ran into the buildings while others ran
out, and later rummaged through the horrific crime scene at Ground
Zero to uncover remains of those we lost, and began to repair New
York City and our nation as a whole. But what makes a firefighter's
life lost on September 11th in the collapsed buildings any more
valuable or compensable than the firefighter who lost his life in an
ordinary burning building on September 10th? Why should the
family of a police officer, who was trapped under the debris of the
World Trade Center and subsequently died from suffocation, receive
compensation for his death when the family of an officer who was
shot the week before in the line of duty may not find relief from a
publicly funded compensation scheme? If the reason is simply
because of the collective consciousness and national psychic scars
inflicted upon us as a result of this terrorist attack, surely this is not a
fair justification. In this way, the 9/11 Fund, especially its renewed
version, regresses the goals of a just legal system and actively
redefines our common law tort principles. This issue, as well as the
goals of traditional tort law in regards to emergency personnel
200. See Anthony J. Sebok, What's Law Got to Do With It? Designing
Compensation Schemes in the Shadow of the Tort System, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 501,
517 (2003).
201. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. City of New York Fire Dept., 754
N.Y.S.2d 517, 519 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (stating that thousands of firefighters were sent
into the World Trade Center after terrorists attacked the buildings on September 11,
2001, but 343 firefighters did not make it out alive).
2014] 545
546 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
mentioned above, must be considered when determining which
victims will receive compensation in the future.
C. What Compensation Should Each Individual Receive?
Because the first 9/11 Fund was an attempt to reflect traditional
private tort law where the victim is made whole, each award was
calculated by incorporating economic damages (loss of future
earnings) and noneconomic damages (loss of enjoyment of life)
limited only by the discretion of the fund's administrator. While its
first version was active, however, the wide variation in payments to
eligible claimants caused a predictable outcry. Regarding economic
loss in particular, the disparity between amounts received was
difficult to justify for many individuals.203 With families of deceased
firefighters and police officers receiving less than those of
individuals who worked in the financial sector, these variations were
viewed as a valuation on the worth of the victims' lives.204 While this
presumably was the not the intention behind the 9/11 Fund, it did
provide that all eligible claimants would receive different awards
determined by the victim's economic "worth" at the time of death in
addition to his or her future economic losses.205 This is a tort-based
approach, a calculation inserted into decisions in courtrooms every
206day outside of the public eye.
This approach may not be as appropriate, however, in the
calculation of compensation for victims of national emergencies
through publicly financed funds. A flat payment approach for losses
207
would minimize the disparity between individual allocations while
adequately satisfying the national demand to heal a collective wound
and providing more equality in reparations. 08 This is exemplified in
202. Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master:
Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 10 (2006).
203. Morrison, supra note 130, at 824.
204. September 11th Compensation: The Impossibility of Making Whole, supra
note 144.
205. Feinberg, supra note 14.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. "The widow living in the $450,000 home should not necessarily receive ten
times more than the widow living in the $45,000 mobile home, as she may have
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the calculation of noneconomic loss and pre-death pain and suffering
used for the 9/11 Fund. As previously mentioned, families of victims
who died as a direct result of the planes crashing on September 11th,
or who subsequently died as a result of debris removal, have been
eligible to collect a flat payment of $250,000 as well as an additional
$100,000 for the victim's spouse and each one of his or her
dependents as compensation for pain and suffering. 209 This method
was employed once it was determined that calculating pain and
suffering in the moments before death would have been extremely
210traumatic, inefficient, and arguably impossible to quantify.
At the very least, a cap should be placed on possible collections by
eligible parties. This cap must be carefully considered and
reevaluated after each national tragedy. The 9/11 Fund has spent, and
will continue to spend, many millions of dollars specifically on
medical-type expenses to alleviate the grief, stress, and trauma
211
associated with the terrorist attacks. While these services are
beneficial for recipients, the continued expenditures to finance them
can become increasingly difficult to justify as the years pass,
especially if that money can be spent on more immediate disaster
recovery.
D. How Should the Compensation Be Funded?
While the Zadroga Act was passed quickly with wide support, the
adoption of a last minute amendment concerning the means with
212
which to compensate the fund has proven contentious. Because the
project requires $4.3 billion dollars, Amendment 4923, proposed by
Senator Kristen Gillibrand, introduced two different taxes designed
more post-9/11 financial resources to draw upon in terms of savings, real and
personal property, life insurance payouts, pensions, etc." Robert A. Katz, A Pig in
A Python: How the Charitable Response to September ]] Overwhelmed the Law of
Disaster Relief, 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 294 (2003).
209. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 53; Morrison, supra note 130,
at 824.
210. FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 40.
211. Stephanie Strom, Finding Cure for Hearts Broken: Sept. 1] Is as Difficult
as Explaining the Cost, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at B1.
212. Nicole R. Best, The Revenue Impact of the Two Percent Excise Tax: The
Congressional Budget Office Estimates Relating to the James Zadroga 9/11 Health
and Compensation Act, 41 PUB. CONT. L.J. 367, 368 (2012).
2014] 547
548 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
to cover the costs.213 The first was a renewal of fees for employers
214
dependent on visas. The second tax was a two percent excise tax
on payments received by foreign persons from countries without
procurement agreements (including any foreign business entity) for
215the sale of goods or services to the U.S. government. According to
a report completed by the Joint Committee on Taxation and released
by the Congressional Budget Office, these proposed taxes were
presumed to produce enough revenue to provide for the costs of the
216Zadroga Act.
Criticism of these new taxes focused on possible issues pertaining
to international trade agreements and concern over whether sufficient
revenue would actually be garnered to pay for the Zadroga Act.217
Even though the Zadroga Act became effective in January 2011, data
indicated that the government did not raise any of the projected $305
million of revenue during fiscal year 2011. 218 One possible
explanation for this shortfall is the fact that the Internal Revenue
Service did not initially promulgate regulations with which to direct
the tax implementation. As a result, agencies were unable to impose
the tax.219 Further, the Joint Committee on Taxation report calculated
the anticipated revenue without properly understanding the
international procurement agreements with which the United States
-220must comply, possibly causing serious international repercussions.
While the idea of a two percent tax on foreign entities or other
similar sources may be the most efficient method to fund the
compensation program, Congress must take the necessary steps to
ensure that such a source is legally sound and economically
achievable.
One way to guarantee this is to include charitable donations as a
collateral source offset in the computation of compensation received
213. Id.
214. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 § 302, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 note (2011).
215. James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act of 2010 § 301, I.R.C. §
5000C (2012).
216. Best, supra note 212, at 368-69.
217. Id. at 369.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 370-71.
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by each eligible claimant. Both versions of the 9/11 Fund contain a
provision for offsetting awards by incorporating certain collateral
sources into the computation, including life insurance, pension funds,
and death benefit programs.221 The 9/11 Fund's collateral source
offset excludes charity, compensation from various State Victim of
Crime Boards funded with federal funds, portions of monetary
compensation received by victim's families through the pensions and
life insurance of the deceased that they have paid for themselves, and
workers' compensation benefits as long as they have not already been
222paid. Therefore, it would be more cost effective to partially, if not
completely, fund compensation through charity and donations.
In the immediate wake of September 11th, over 300 charities
collected for victims and their survivors, with thirty-five charities
223
alone raising over $2.7 billion. One survey estimated that nearly
two-thirds of households in America gave donations in response to
224the terrorist attacks. Many donations were made specifically to
support firefighters and other first responders, and their families. The
Twin Towers Fund collected approximately $440,640 for every one
of the 438 uniformed and other official personnel who lost their lives
225
at the World Trade Center, and $418,000 was raised for every one
of the 343 deceased firefighters through The New York Firefighters
9/11 Disaster Relief Fund. 226 In fact, these types of charities
221. Feinberg, supra note 14; Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 53-
54; Morrison, supra note 130, at 826-27.
222. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 44, 54-55.
223. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-259, SEPTEMBER 11: MORE
EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION COULD ENHANCE CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS'
CONTRIBUTIONS IN DISASTERS 7-8 (2002); U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-02-1037, SEPTEMBER 11: INTERIM REPORT ON THE RESPONSE OF CHARITIES
2 (2002).
224. Kathryn S. Steinberg & Patrick M. Rooney, America Gives: Survey of
Americans' Generosity After September 11, 34 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY
SECTOR Q. 110, 118 (2005) (a telephone survey revealed that 65.6% of 1304 adults
or their households contributed money for victims of the terrorist attacks on
September 11th).
225. Katz, supra note 208, at 254.
226. TOM SEESSEL, FORD FOUND., THE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE TO 9/11, at 42
(2002), http://www.fordfoundation.org/pdfs/library/philanthropic response.pdf.
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ultimately raised more than $500 million-approximately $1.25
million per firefighter family.227
In addition to these donations, the first 9/11 Fund made an average
payment of $1.5 million to the surviving beneficiaries of 9/11
victims. Because the United States does not have the unlimited
resources of past eras, and we could face serious fiscal decline if we
do not curtail government spending, it may be time to restructure our
approach to compensation for victims of national tragedies. 228
Whether these calamities are terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or
epidemics, Congress and the American public should, on a case-by-
case basis, make determinations regarding the general disbursement
of funds and the establishment of compensation funds in light of the
ideas presented throughout this Note. 229
In the meantime, the federal government and state governments
should set up reserve and emergency funds out of revenues and other
small taxes to begin preparing for the future. Then, in the aftermath
of a national tragedy, the federal government and state governments
should, to the extent that they can, provide for food, shelter, medical
services, psychological assistance, and compensation for losses in
conjunction with the relief provided by certain organizations, such as
private charities. Finally, we as a nation must examine what is
appropriate beyond this to determine what can further recovery and
continued growth.
227. See generally Ingrassia, supra note 132.
228. Congress should:
[S]trike a balance between the passion and impulse to support the 9/11
victims and the need to be prudent in creating a responsible compensation
structure. While in a typical mass-tort settlement this would be done by
defendants and plaintiffs reaching a mutually beneficial agreement
through a negotiation process, the Fund was forced to do so artificially
and quickly.
Steenson & Sayler, supra note 17, at 533; see also FEINBERG, WHAT Is LIFE
WORTH?, supra note 145, at 28.
229. See generally Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424,
439 (1997) (finding that although the law must be interpreted to account for harms
suffered by the sympathetic plaintiff, "the consequences and effects of a rule of
law" created to permit recovery must also be considered) (emphasis in original).
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V. CONCLUSION
There are many advantages to a victim compensation fund as a
legal response to terrorist attacks and other similar national
calamities. Such programs provide a guaranteed system of
compensation for those who suffer life's greatest tragedies, and offer
comfort for our deep national scars while holding our government
accountable for any possible oversight or miscalculation in the
protection of our safety. These benefits, however, must also be
weighed against the shortcomings of such compensation funds. There
are five notable issues of concern with the 9/11 Fund under the
Zadroga Act. First, the lack of equal treatment regarding victims of
other terrorist attacks needs to be addressed. Second, the varying
amounts of compensation that the victims of September 11th and
their families received have led even Feinberg himself to strongly
lean in the direction of a flat payment approach for all claimants
230
under future compensation funds enacted due to a terrorist attack.
Given the possibility that a future attack may be of even greater
magnitude, such payment should be economically reasonable. Third,
due to the outpouring of public aid after September 11th, charitable
donations should be considered a collateral offset when calculating
future award for eligible claimants. 23 Fourth, the inclusion of
firefighters and other emergency responders under such a
compensation fund who die or are injured on duty in the aftermath of
an attack must be reevaluated in light of the goals of our legal
system. This is strictly a contractual argument that reflects the
assumption of inherent risks associated with these professions.
Finally, the problematic issues of causation, indeterminable
allocation of responsibility, and indefinite plaintiffs may prove
difficult to overcome when crating compensation funds for mass
toxic torts as suitable legal alternatives to tort litigation arising from
national catastrophes.
230. See supra note 207.
231. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5, at 44. During the first 9/11 Fund,
because life insurance, pension funds, and other such programs have been included
as collateral offsets to the awards distributed to claimants, cost to the Treasury was
reduced by more than $2.9 billion. See SHAPO, supra note 52, at 121.
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